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INTRODUCTION

In the decade following the fall of Communism, many transition countries have struggled to develop systems of governance that are equal to the
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task of supporting and regulating their new market economies. This involves a major reconstruction of their systems of public administration and
the creation of various kinds of accountability mechanisms that can bring
bureaucracies that once operated with relative impunity under some degree
of meaningful public control. Limiting bureaucratic discretion is viewed as
having the potential to increase simultaneously the predictability and fairness of regulatory processes. In theory, information asymmetries can be
reduced and regulatory transaction costs lowered, strengthening the kind of
supportive roles for civil society--emphasizing "voice" and public-private
partnerships-that are emblematic of so-called second wave public sector
reform.'
Initially, much emphasis was placed on increasing government accountability through invigoration of the separation of powers-a fiction during
the communist era-so that enhanced institutional checks and balances (socalled "horizontal accountability") 2 would be afforded by greater legislative
oversight, constitutional review by the courts, and increased hierarchical
control of ministries by presidential or cabinet administration (and possibly
special audit bodies). But there are real limits to state capabilities in societies where state institutions are often significantly discredited, material resources are scarce, and otherwise qualified civil servants have gravitated to
the private sector. Even in semi-consolidated transitional democracies 3which likely represent a relatively small fraction of the total number of transition countries around the world4 -plentiful corruption and extensive cli-

1. See THE WORLD BANK, REFORMrNG PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING

A WORLD BANK STRATEGY 22-27 (2000) ("These include various forms of
representative decision making and political oversight; direct involvement by users, nongovernmental organizations and other groups.. ...
2. The term "horizontal" accountability was first coined by Guillermo O'Donnell. A
thorough discussion of this concept appears in Andreas Schedler, ConceptualizingAccountGOVERNANCE:

ability, in THE

SELF-REsTRAINING

STATE:

POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

IN NEw

DEMOCRACIES 12-28 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).

3. Although the term "democratic consolidation" has come under fire over the past
several years due to definitional imprecision, and what one observer calls its "strong teleological flavor," the term still has a basic explanitory power in relation to a country's situation on a spectrum of institutionalized accountability. See David Collier & Steven Levitsky,
Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, 49 WORLD

POL. 443 (1997) (stating that one set of distinctions relevant here is between mere "electoral
democracy" where there are relatively free and fair elections but poorly developed governance institutions, and more evolved forms of "liberal democracy" and "advanced democracy"), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/world politics/v049/49.3collier.htnl.
4. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FH COUNTRY RATINGS, available at http://
www.freedomhouse.org (last modified May 21, 2001) (publishing an annual assessment of
the state of freedom by assigning each country status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free"
based on an average of political rights and civil liberties ratings). Latvia, for example, has
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entelist arrangements within and between the various branches of government hamper the development of meaningful checks on bureaucratic discretion.
Faced with these formidable challenges, reformers in some transition
countries may be increasingly drawn to a number of complementary accountability mechanisms that rely less exclusively on state institutions and
more on various forms of direct citizen monitoring and participation (what
is often termed "vertical" accountability).5 Even in countries where civil
society was weakened by decades of Communist rule, there are a number
of these under-appreciated mechanisms--emphasizing transparency and
public participation in executive branch decision making-that are beginning to emerge as a result of international norm-setting (e.g., the attraction
of European Union (E.U.) accession) and concerted pressure by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the business community. These
mechanisms include government-civil society councils or other consultative arrangements, laws requiring the government to furnish affirmatively
certain basic information to the public, laws affording the public access to
many other kinds of government information, procedures facilitating public
input into the rulemaking process, and administrative procedure systems
strengthening citizens' ability to challenge bureaucratic decisions meaningfully within agencies as well as in the courts.
These tools directly or indirectly seek to improve accountability in government decision making by enhancing procedural regularity, proper delegation of authority, reasoned justification, and most critically-transparency and public participation. These are all central concerns of what, in the
West, usually falls under the rubric of administrative law (or may be a central feature of what is known in most civil law countries as "public law").
In more advanced Western democracies, such functions take maximum advantage of sophisticated formal institutions for their operation--e.g., the
courts and a highly trained community of legal professionals. In many
transition countries, such institutions may be at a quite rudimentary stage of
development. An important question, however, is whether the key mechanisms comprising an administrative law framework can nevertheless operate relatively successfully in transition countries with certain bright-line
rules and a measure of give-and-take between bureaucrats and citizens.
Only now might answers begin to be formulated to this question, as certain
of the more advanced transition countries--e.g., the so-called Visegrad namoved from an overall rating of 3 (on a scale of 1-7, with I being the highest level of freedom) for political rights, 3 for civil liberties, and a "partly free" overall rating in 1993-1994,
to a I for political rights, 2 for civil liberties and a "free" overall rating from 1998 to 2001.
Id.
5. See Schedler, supra note 2.
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tions (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the Baltics
(Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and a few others, such as Slovenia-have
adopted some of these mechanisms in the past several years. Still, there is
little or no empirical literature on how well and how frequently they are
being utilized.
The purpose of this Article is to offer one such country-Latvia-as a
case study affording an overview of the chief conceptual and implementation issues attending administrative law reform in transition countries. The
authors had the privilege to work in Latvia in 2001 in connection with
World Bank-funded initiatives supporting improved legal frameworks for
public access to information and administrative procedure. While the engagement focused on improvements to the legal framework and planning
for successful implementation of laws on administrative procedure and access to information, it illuminated the conceptual and practical challenges
standing in the way of expanded usage of many kinds of public accountability mechanisms. This Article draws on these insights while also seeking to examine why administrative law as a topic has been so absent from
general discussions of legal and regulatory reform in transition countries.
A clearer understanding of some of these fundamental issues can better
frame the questions sought to be answered through subsequent, more rigorous empirical research. It can also provide new perspectives on the broad
mixture of formal and informal institutions that may best contribute to
overall governmental accountability in these countries.
This Article is organized into four parts: (1) an introduction to the subject of administrative law-broadly defined-in transition countries; (2) an
examination of the challenges facing administrative law reform in one transition country-Latvia-in terms of efforts to create and/or improve five
key accountability mechanisms; (3) an overview of the kinds of strategies
that need to be pursued in Latvia-and potentially other transition countries-in order to implement successfully and institutionalize such mechanisms in the near-to-medium term; and (4) a brief conclusion.
I.

THE BROADER CONTEXT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM IN
TRANSITION COUNTRIES

The ability of individual citizens and businesses to obtain information
about government operations generally, as well as the impact of particular
government programs, policies, and decisions, represents a fundamental
element of accountable governance. So too does the ability of the public to
challenge administrative actions, and to have a say in the development of
policies, laws, and regulations. These rights are especially important in engendering trust between the state and civil society and in legitimizing a
country's various regulatory systems. This is where the state's fidelity to
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the Rule of Law, or lack thereof, is most likely to be experienced by the average citizen or business.
Many of these topics can be subsumed under the rubric of administrative
law and procedure. The defining objective of administrative law and procedure in Western democracies is controlling administrative discretion.6
However, the mechanisms under consideration in this Article seek to curb
such discretion primarily through direct civil society oversight rather than
through the checks and balances of other state institutions. The challenge
of developing appropriate accountability mechanisms looms large in the
former communist countries, where the state's share of the economy was
often all-encompassing, the bureaucracy dominated the lives of individual
citizens, and civil society was extraordinarily and purposefully enfeebled.
Steeped in civil law traditions and having largely adopted parliamentary
or quasi-parliamentary systems, most transition countries have tended, over
the past decade, to embrace a formal framework for bureaucratic control
that favors legislative oversight supplemented by substantive judicial review in individual cases.8 Among the Central and East European countries
seeking E.U. membership, these general preferences have been bolstered
by various E.U. directives and general guidance from E.U. administrative
law experts.
In reality, the institutional endowments of these countries make excessive near-term reliance on such formal mechanisms somewhat problematic.
Parliamentary structures and party organizations may both be immature,
leading to less than robust oversight practices. Moreover, the very nature
of parliamentary governance may in certain contexts lead to a form of clientelism where dominant political parties are rewarded with leadership of
certain ministries and it is widely understood that executive branch agents
are to be left to their own devices with minimal or no political supervision.

6.

See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

(1969).
7. See Howard Fenton, Administrative Law Reform in the FormerSoviet Union, 7 J.
E. EuR. L. 47, 75-77 (2000). In most communist countries, "administrative law" came to be
primarily associated with an Administrative Violations Code, a broad collection of quasicriminal infractions whose primary purpose was to regulate a wide range of personal behavior and enforce lower-level norms promulgated by administrative agencies. The emphasis was on enforcing social control of the population through the agency of regulatory inspectors and the police rather than on holding bureaucrats accountable for their actions.
Citizens' procedural protections were limited, and only some appeals could be taken to the
courts, whose effectiveness was notably compromised. While the institution of the Procuracy was charged with rooting out some administrative abuses, in fact the exercise of such
power was rare and subject to political manipulation by the Communist Party.
8. See generally DRNs J. GALLIGAN & DANIEL M.
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1996-1998 (1999).

SMILOv, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN
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Even were such supervision to assume more vigorous forms, disorganized,
demoralized, and under-funded civil services systems in most transition

countries can complicate or subvert parliamentary intentions. Meanwhile,
similarly weak judicial capacity and the significant human and material re-

sources necessary to overcome it, renders meaningful judicial review of
administrative action a longer-term prospect in many transition countries. 9

For many such countries, other kinds of accountability mechanisms involving greater civil society participation may be called for. Yet even these
mechanisms face certain impediments to their usage. From a practical
standpoint, civil servants, NGO leaders, and business representatives must
further develop their capacity to interact responsibly and intelligently in the
regulatory arena. In most cases, NGOs and business associations have
farther to travel in this regard: there are numerous organizational and financial obstacles to sustainability, as well as deep public skepticism about such
groups' professionalism and political independence.
Other obstacles are conceptual in nature: despite their importance in es-

tablishing certain rules of the game in state-civil society interactions, administrative law and procedure are often viewed as mundane, fragmented,
and highly idiosyncratic subjects even to public administration specialists.
Meanwhile, procedural mechanisms attending regulatory reform are given

short shrift by most technocrats engaged in substantive reform initiatives,
whether in the banking, utilities, health, or any number of other sectors) °
As a result of these issues, administrative law as such has not represented
an area of emphasis for donor funding agencies."
9. See, e.g., Paul H. Brietzke, Democratizationand... Administrative Law, 52 OKLA.
L. REv. 1, 24 (1999) (arguing that it has "proved difficult for inexperienced, rather timid
judges to apply [administrative law) concepts in very different, Third World cultural contexts."). Based on the need for high levels of technical expertise and significant expenditure
of funds, the judiciary may not be a feasible option as the centerpiece of administrative accountability in transition countries, although in the longer run, its overall importance seems
to be unrivaled.
10. This blind spot extends to the bureaucratic politics that drive the design and implementation of reform programs. Among government reformers and donor agencies alike,
administrative law does not fit neatly into democracy and governance or economic development stovepipes. Insofar as administrative law and procedure embody crosscutting procedural principles, they also lack natural, concentrated constituencies among a country's
regulators and/or regulated subjects. Finally, each ministry or agency has special procedural
norms and its own way of conducting regulatory business that tend to obscure the massive
collective impact that such processes have on the daily lives of millions of citizens. Harmonizing or eliminating dozens or hundreds of such special norms to bring them into conformity with common democratic principles involves considerable legal and bureaucratic
spadework.
11. Possibly due to the fact that administrative law embraces many disparate conceptual elements and is not a universally recognized term with a uniform meaning among most
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Political resistance may also complicate matters due to the impact that
various administrative procedural changes may have on regulatory proc-

esses if implemented on a national scale; it is not surprising that the opponents of such change may be quite prominent in most transition countries.
Subscribing to clearer and more uniform procedural norms that facilitate
public participation may involve the surrender of special knowledge and

information I2asymmetries that are especially conducive to rent-seeking opportUnities.
There may be still other costs involved in expanding public participation

in the regulatory process. To begin with, it can enlarge the number of
players in, and lengthen the process of, policy formulation and decision
making. At its most basic, administrative law reform in transition countries
usually involves the systematic transfer of some monitoring and control
functions away from the executive and legislative branches (which may be
closely aligned with one another in parliamentary systems) and over to the
judicial branch and/or civil society. One would not expect bureaucrats to
cede such power readily; indeed, as one specialist in comparative administrative law notes, only in polities with a significant measure of contested
civil law countries, neither The World Bank nor the Asian Development Bank has recognized that subject as a deserving focus for legal reform and/or governance initiatives. At the
same time, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has similarly bypassed
the subject, despite its direct relevance to regulatory reform and USAID's efforts to integrate economic reform and democracy and governance programming (so-called "EG-DG
linkages"). The closest that these donor agencies have come to the subject matter of administrative law are explorations of increased public participation in government policy
making (often in the context of decentralization and local government reform efforts), see,
e.g., Harry Blair, Participationand Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local
Governance in Six Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 21-39 (2000); DERICK BRINKERHOFF, U.S.
AGENCY

FOR INT'L DEV.,

STATE-CIVIL

SOCIETY PARTNERSHIPS FOR ADVOCACY

AND

IMPLEMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNruRES (Implementing Policy Change Project, Working Paper No. 23, 1998), and the general use of "voice" mechanisms to enhance government
commitments in regulatory policy, see, e.g., Brian Levy, Credible Regulatory Policy: Options and Evaluation, in THE WORLD BANK, EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

178, 184-89 (Robert Picciotto & Eduardo Wiesner eds., 1998).

Similarly, the Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar
Association has not included an emphasis on administrative law reform. See CENT. & E.
EuR. L. INITIATIVE, AM. BAR Ass'N, SPECIAL ANNIVERSARY ANNUAL REPORT 1990-2000,
available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/2000an.pdf (listing country reports according to
categories including commercial law, gender equality issues, judicial reform, legal profession reform, criminal law reform, legal education reform, but not administrative law).
12. See Blanca Heredia & Ben Ross Schneider, The PoliticalEconomy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries, in REINVENTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

38 n.25 (Blanca Heredia & Ben Ross Schneider eds., unpublished,

2000) (stating that bureaucrats will tend to resist and resent such reforms because they provide superiors with alternative sources of information concerning their behavior), available
at http://www.northwestem.edu/cics/adminreform/toc.htm.
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government might one expect to find adequate political support for administrative law reform, as competing political parties that imagine finding
themselves out of power in the near future
seek to alter and strengthen the
3
tools that constrain bureaucratic agents.1
Despite these potential points of resistance, administrative law reform
may actually represent a relatively cost-effective legal reform investment
for those transition countries that have demonstrated significant progress
toward democratization, and do have relatively stable political systems and
a modicum of contested government. First, and potentially most important,
the introduction or enhancement of certain vertical accountability mechanisms can serve to foster democracy with a "small d" by channeling and
mediating state-civil society interactions in discrete sectoral contexts where
the daily lives of large numbers of citizens may be influenced.1 4 Administrative law reform can thus advance sectoral regulatory reform efforts that
are broadly popular (e.g., telecommunications, energy, or agricultural reform) and therefore, attract significant and diverse sources of support.
Second, because administrative law and procedure can be pursued on a
sectorial or agency-by-agency basis (even after a national framework law is
passed), favorable political economies can produce individual "islands of
reform" that have important local or demonstration effects relative to national reform efforts.
Third, such mechanisms can provide a fresh approach to legal reform by
concentrating on processes that cultivate structured interaction and development5 of trust between government officials and their NGO counterparts.1
Finally, many of the administrative law mechanisms under consideration
13. See TOM GINSBURG, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE FROM
NORTHEAST ASIA 4 (Univ. of Ill. School of Law, Working Paper No. 00-66, 2000) ("Politicians may also be able to influence bureaucratic agents through direct manipulation of incentive structures.... By advancing loyal agents,... politicians provide bureaucrats with
an incentive to perform."), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com.
14. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, ParticipatoryJustice in the Philippines, in MANY ROADS
TO JUSTICE: THE LAW RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE
WORLD 197, 208-12 (M. McClymont & S. Golub eds., 2000) (describing the activities of socalled Alternative Law Groups--groups specializing in issue representation or strategic litigation in the social, economic and environmental arenas-in providing policy advice and
shaping regulatory reform, particularly in the environmental and agricultural sectors). The
phrase "Democracy with a small 'd" comes from Stephen Golub, Democracy as Development: A Casefor Civil Society Assistance in Asia, in FUNDING VIRTUE: CIVIL SOCIETY AID
Am DEMOCRACY PROMOrTION 135-39 (Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers eds., 2000).
15. See LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TowARD CONSOLIDATION 243
(1999) (focusing on concrete mechanisms that increase state-civil society dialogue to realize
the potential of civil society to "serve democracy by structuring multiple channels, beyond
the political party, for articulating, aggregating, and representing interests.").
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are relatively inexpensive to implement and do not necessarily require a
well-developed legal system or a high degree of sophistication in the legal
community in order to function passably. Indeed, many administrative law
processes may simply consolidate and formalize institutional patterns or
rules of the game that have already emerged on a voluntary, quasi-selfenforcing basis (e.g., various consultative processes). Placing these
mechanisms on a more durable legal footing-through adoption of simple,
practical, bright-line rules-may reinforce nascent respect for procedural
regularity on the part of government and civil society.
II. MECHANISMS FACILITATING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION MAKING IN LATVIA

Latvia exemplifies a transition country finding itself in fairly favorable
circumstances for developing meaningful public participation and access to
information mechanisms. The country also has an extensive "usable past,"
whereby its prewar independence, well-developed civil society, and relative legal sophistication all provide an important foundation for consolidating democratic governance generally.16 The country has a vigorous
multiparty system, relatively free and competent press, 17 and strong traditions of parliamentary rule. It has enjoyed steady economic growth over
the past decade.' 8 The country's aspirations for E.U. accession and the seriousness with which it has embraced the accession process also reflect a
relatively strong political will for governance reform. Meanwhile, the
country's strong ties to Germany and the Nordic countries have also pro16. In the area of administrative law, Latvia was in the forefront of European countries
pioneering a unified administrative procedure code. In May 1940, shortly before it was occupied by the Soviet Union, the Latvian Ministry of Justice circulated a draft administrative
procedure code. Latvia was only the second European country to attempt to pass such a
law, following Austria, which had earlier adopted such a statute. See Rasnacs Dzintars,
Draft Administrative Process Law: Summary (unpublished paper, on file with authors) (explaining the need for a new Latvian administrative procedure law that accompanied the draft
law as submitted to Parliament). Latvia had previously passed a law on special administrative courts in 1921. See Ilmars Bisers, The Current Problems of Latvian Administrative
Procedure,2 LATVIAN HuM. RTs. Q. 7, 8 (1997) (stating the independent republic of Latvia
adopted a law on administrative courts that remained in effect until annexation of Latvia by
Soviet Union in 1940).
17. See WORLD AuDIT, PREss FREEDOM TABLE, available at http://
www.worldaudit.org/press.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (ranking Latvia as 34th out of
149 countries in its ranking of the degree of press freedom among the nations of the world).
18. See generally Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, in TIM
GLOBAL DIVERGENCE OF DEMOcRACms 167-84 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 2001)
(noting a study of 135 countries over several decades concluded among the most critical
factors necessary for apparent achievement of stable democracies were significant economic
growth and enduring parliamentary institutions).
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vided reformers with some of the world's best expertise and reform models
in the areas of public administration. Government reformers have embarked on an ambitious multi-faceted, anti-corruption program and adopted
significant legislation on access to information and administrative procedure.19 The government is also moving to allow greater public input into
the drafting of regulations and is increasingly committed to improving the
public relations function in each ministry and agency. 20 Finally, civil society in Latvia shows increasing vibrancy in terms of its willingness to
monitor and participate in policy making (particularly in the welfare and
environmental sectors), and some organizations have demonstrated a parin matters of governmental transparency and public consulticular 2interest
1
tation.
Despite these advantages, Latvia also suffers from many of the governance problems endemic to transition countries. Corruption is still a major
problem,22 the country's public administration framework is disorganized,
and there is high turnover among civil servants. The capacity of many
NGOs and business associations is weak insofar as they tend to lack a tradition of professionalism, and have a limited appreciation of how to promote internal democracy and appeal to broader constituent concerns.
Similarly, most civil servants, especially at the municipal level, lack an understanding of what it means to be responsive to the public. Except for a
handful of upper-level judges, the judiciary lacks the material and human
resources necessary to force greater legality on the part of government
agencies or command general public respect commensurate with this mission.
This Latvian environment is important from an illustrative point of view,
in that the challenges faced by administrative law reformers in that country
are likely to be replicated in many other transition states and, indeed, are
likely to prove even more formidable in the majority of such countries,
particularly those in the former Soviet Union. Latvia's experience may,
19. See infra pp. 478-81.
20. See infra pp. 476-78.
21. For example, the NGO Delna-the local branch of Transparency International-has
undertaken inquiries into the functioning of both access to information processes and con-

sultative mechanisms in Latvia. It has also played a significant role in monitoring the privatization of large enterprises, the government's anti-corruption program, and the drafting
of the state and municipal procurement law. See DELNA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, at
http://www.delna.lv/english/ar2000.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) [hereinafter DELNA
ANNUAL REPORT]; Interview with Inese Voika, Executive Director, Delna (Mar. 19, 2001).

22. See Press Release, Transparency International, New Index Highlights Worldwide
Corruption Crisis (June 27, 2001) (ranking Latvia 59th out of 94 countries ranking countries
based on "vicious cycle of poverty and corruption"), available at http://
www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi200l.html (last visited Feb. 6,2002)
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therefore, serve as a kind of benchmark, indicating that reforms facing
trouble in that nation may not be suitable in the near-term for many other
transition countries with ostensibly less favorable institutional endowments.
Based on the existing legal framework, this Article examines five discrete types of vertical accountability mechanisms based on the Latvian experience: (1) advisory councils and other consultative mechanisms; (2) affirmative provision of information; (3) public participation in ministerial
rulemaking and legislative drafting; (4) responsive provision of information
upon request; and (5) a system of administrative appeals. The foregoing
sequence represents an ascending order that roughly reflects the increasing
time, resources, and legal formality (and often, legal sophistication) that
may be necessary to institutionalize their effective use.23
Each of these types of mechanisms can influence and restrain executive
branch decision making at distinct stages of an agency's regulatory process.
Advisory councils and consultative mechanisms constitute channels of
communication whereby stable, knowledgeable interest groups provide input into the development and execution of policy by the agency. Affirmative provision of information represents an ongoing effort by ministries and
agencies to provide the public with basic information about these entities
and the regulatory process. Public participation in the legislative drafting
process affords an opportunity to provide comment on draft legislation or
regulations and represents an opportunity to influence government decision
making at junctures where policies are being translated into legal norms.
Responsive provision of information permits the public to obtain even
more detailed and targeted information about an agency's execution of
policy. And a clear administrative procedure framework permits affected
parties to challenge concrete regulatory decisions in specific cases. The
themes of transparency and participation run through each of these mechanisms, which can supplement efforts to ensure accountability in other ways.
A. ConsultativeMechanisms
In the interest of improving the technical quality of policy making and
rulemaking, and adding some degree of stakeholder participation, government officials often turn to formal or semi-formal consultative mechanisms
(CMs) to gather information and elicit opinions from knowledgeable and
interested individuals or organizations. Because they can, at their very
23. For example, consultative processes can function quite effectively in the absence of
formal procedures or abundant funding. By contrast, even a modestly functional responsive
information access system or administrative procedure regime requires large outlays of
money, large numbers of trained individuals, and a significant level of legal sophistication.

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW

[54:1

simplest, involve a handful of representatives functioning as an advisory
body with little institutional infrastructure or budget, CMs may be one of

the least costly accountability investments that a government (or individual
ministry) can make as it seeks to obtain additional expertise and/or political

legitimacy. On the other hand, empowering CMs to serve as more truly
representative forums for diverse sectoral or social interests can involve a
greater expenditure of time and resources, not to mention political risk.
CMs describe a very broad range of public-private bodies. They extend
from formal councils established by statute to address specific policies and
draft legislation at regularly scheduled meetings, to informally chartered
groups that are convened from time to time to discuss general topics like

the climate of government-business relations. 24 The potential benefits of

such consultation include improved information for public and private de-

cision making; greater consensus about the ownership and credibility of
policy reforms; and reduced costs of business-government transactions
through habitual interaction and the generation of social capital.
Risks also attend the operation of such bodies, however, including pos-

sible reinforcement of the power of existing elites and insiders; the use of
such entities as vehicles for rent-seeking; and their circumvention of
broader and possibly more transparent forums for policy dialogue. 25 CMs
around the world have been organized on a national basis (e.g., South Africa's National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)), 26
24. Depending on their formality and the extent of their use, CMs may reflect an underlying "corporatist" model of state-society relations quite common in many parts of the
world, including much of Western and Eastern Europe. Under this model, the government
selects or gives a privileged place to certain interlocutors for policy dialogue from the array
of key interest groups in society (most notably labor unions and employers' associations, but
also in many cases groups with various other social agendas). This corporatist model is
generally distinguishable from an American interest group pluralism model. In the former
case, one of the benefits of CMs from a government perspective is that they help to lower
the costs of citizen participation and make it more manageable. In the latter case, depending
on the extent of participation permitted, public participation can actually cause delay and the
accrual of additional costs in decision making, thereby leading to administrative "ossification."
25. Such concerns were among the reasons for the enactment, in 1972, of the U.S. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15 (1994)). See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal
Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 453 (1997) (stating Act "was designed to formalize and routinize what was already an age-old institution, in
part out of concern that some interests had come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive decisionmakers.").
26. See NAT'L EcoN. D v. & LABOUR COUNCIL, at http://www.nedlac.org.za (last visited Jan. 31,2002). For an interesting look at several kinds of so-called "economic forums,"
see U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., PARTICIPATION, CONSULTATION, AND ECONOMIC REFoRM
IN AFRICA: ECONOMC FoRA AND THE EG-DG NExus (2001) (examining several different
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sectoral basis (e.g., Ghana's Private Sector Roundtable), or industry or
functional basis (e.g., Latvia's Road Traffic Safety Council).28 Successful
CMs seem to share five important characteristics:
"

They have a specific and well-defined set of objectives;

*

They have transparent internal procedures and strong public participation;

•

They have an effective secretariat or similar unit that streamlines the
organization's work;

*

Membership is drawn from broad sectoral or functional constituencies rather than industries whose narrow interests may skew the
work of such bodies; and

*

They feature follow-up and monitoring procedures that enable CM
participants to know what happens following any formal or informal
agreements produced during CM discussions.

Latvia has a wide range of CMs, from those with well-defined objectives
and significant policymaking duties (e.g., the Tripartite Coordinating
Commission that takes up most matters of social welfare policy and legislation) to those whose agendas are looser and government commitment
possibly weaker (e.g., the National Economic Council, which provides
high-level business community and other advice on the economy, but
which is reportedly not very influential). In general, however, many segments of civil society and the private sector---e.g., individual trade unions
and small businesses-are underrepresented on councils in Latvia. 29 Most
participatory economic policymaking forums, including, in addition to NEDLAC, the

Ugandan National Forum (Uganda), the National Economic Forum (Ghana), and the Tripartite Negotiating Forum and National Economic Consultative Forum (Zimbabwe)), available at http:/www.usaid.gov/democracy/pdfspnacmO02.pdf .
27. See JOSEPH AYEE ET AL., GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN GHANA: THE
ExPERIENcE WITH CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS 33-36 (The World Bank, PSD, Occasional
Paper No. 36, 1999) (on file with authors), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
beext/resources/documents/Text.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).
28. See DELNA, ENHANCING GREATER DECISION-MAKING TRANSPARENCY. [sic]
FUNCTION DELEGATION TO NoN-GoVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2000-2001) (on file with

authors). This paper is an unpublished, rough translation of a study of various councils or
boards in Latvia undertaken by Delna in 2000-2001. The legal basis of the Council is a
regulation of October 24, 1995. It is established under the guidance of the Ministry of
Transport.
29. Interview with Henriks Danusevicz, head of the Latvian Merchants Association
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CMs in Latvia also lack well-staffed or well-funded secretariats.
Among the most important ways to strengthen CMs in Latvia may be the
following:
*

Create greater public awareness of the work of CMs generally, as
well as pressure for greater accountability;

*

Develop a greater appreciation by NGOs and the business community of the need for stronger technical expertise and professionalism
in working with CMs;

*

Encourage the government to adopt a concerted CM improvement
strategy and possibly, uniform basic guidelines for CMs; and

*

Encourage greater CM reliance on substantive working groups and
subcommittees.

An important consideration in improving the functioning of CMs in transition countries is the need to avoid usurping the powers and legitimacy of
official decisionmaking and policymaking organs. CMs should complement, not substitute for, such formal bodies. Particularly in a transition environment where formal authority may not be well institutionalized, certain
CMs may easily become too powerful or too unrepresentative and serve as
a means of circumventing formally elected or delegated agencies. Some
degree of transparency may also be lost. The quest to achieve consensus in
CMs that are imperfectly constituted and to produce more streamlined policy making could retard the development of democratic accountability in
certain contexts.30 Ultimately, both government ministries and civil society
representatives in transition countries must seek to find the right "fit" between CMs and more traditional and formal channels of policy making.
B. Affirmative Provisionof Government Information
Government accountability depends critically on access to information.
Indeed, general information about executive branch organization, processes, and substantive policies represents the basic currency of government
accountability. Such transparency enhances control of administration,
helps create more efficient public sector program delivery, and contributes
(Mar. 21, 2001).
30. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege:

Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1279, 1287-97 (1994) (arguing some consensusbased policy making processes in Germany lack sufficient transparency and representativeness to lay claim to representing the public interest).
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to more vibrant and informed political life. The absence of such information may increase opportunities for abuse of authority, corruption, and
poorly informed decision making.
Access to government information may be largely informal, haphazard,
and dependent on the preferences of current officeholders-as it is in most
countries around the world--or it can be formalized in law and institutionalized in practice. In recent years, international law has recognized the importance of freedom of information.31
In discussions about democracy and individual rights, the responsive
provision of information upon request invariably garners the most attention. Yet establishment and maintenance of such a system of information
access requires considerable time and resources, as well as legal expertise.
By contrast, the affirmative provision of information by the government
can be prioritized and routinized along more predictable budget and human
resource parameters by making available certain classes of official information regarded as the most vital to the economy and political discourse.32
Requiringcertain kinds of government information to be made available in
easy-to-access locations and formats can have a critical impact on citizens'
and businesses' efforts to understand how their national, regional, and local
governments are structured, financed, and operated, and how key government regulatory functions affect them. Affirmative disclosure of basic
government information, is thus, not only a logical precedent to a system of
responsive information provision-insofar as it provides an informational
"road map" necessary for making particular government information requests-but it provides a view of government operations that is often critical for individual planning and risk calculation.
Several countries have laws on access to information that 33include af34
firmative provision requirements, including the United States, Ireland,

31. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, reprinted in BARRY
E. CARTER & PILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 383 (3d ed.
2001-2002); The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, id. at 393; and
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 10, id. at 466.
32. The terms "active" and "passive" are sometimes used instead of "affirmative" and
"responsive." See, e.g., REG'L ENVTL. CTR., DOORS TO DEMOCRACY: CURRENT TRENDS AND
PRACTICES IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING IN WESTERN

EUROPE 16-21 (1998) [hereinafter DOORS TO DEMOCRACY: WESTERN EUROPE]. We believe
the latter terms are more appropriate, because "passive" understates the effort involved in
responding to requests for information.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing access to public
information, agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings).
34. See Freedom of Information Act, No. 13 § 15 (1997) (Ir.) (titling specific provision
"Publication of information about public bodies."), available at http://www.irlgov.ie/
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Australia, 35 Canada,36 Hong Kong,37 Hungary, 38 and South Africa. 39 These
laws mandate that information about government agencies, including poli-

cies, decisions, interpretations, and staff manuals and/or instructions be
made public. Other countries may have a custom of making these basic

kinds of information accessible, or may have specialized requirements associated with particular institutions.
Latvia's Law on Information Access (LIA), adopted in 1998,40 does not
have an affirmative information access requirement, although several indi-

vidual laws (e.g., Law on State Statistics, 4' Law on the Bank of Latvia 42)
require specific kinds of disclosure. The only significant nationwide affirmative publication requirement comes from the Cabinet of Ministers' Instruction on the Procedure for Preparing Annual Public Statements.43 The
requirement mandates that national agencies annually disclose information
about their mission, activities, budgets, personnel, research, and key acoic/2132/freeact.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
35. See Freedom of Information Act, 1982, No. 3 § 8 pt.II (1982) (Austl.) (titling specific provision "Publication of certain documents and information"), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/numact/foial982222/s8.htnil (last visited Feb. 6,
2002).
36. See Access to Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-1 § 5 (1985) (Can.) (titling the specific provision "Information about Government Institutions"), available at http://
www.infocom.gc.ca/acts/pdfs/accessact.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
37. See Code on Access to Information, § 1.4 (effective Dec. 23, 1996) (Hong Kong)
(titling specific provision "Information to be published or made available routinely"), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/access/code.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
38. See Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Publicity of Data
of Public Interest, ch. II § 19 (1992) (Hungary) (titling specific provision "Publicity of the
Data of Public Interest'), available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/countries/hungary/
hungaryprivacylawl 992.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
39. See Promotion of Access to Information Act, §§ 14-16 (2000) (RSA) (titling specific provision "Publication and availability of certain records"), available at http://
www.privacyinternational.org/countriessouthafrica/accessinfobill.pdf, and at http://
www.pmg.org.za/odb/B67B-98Final.htin (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
40. See The Law on Information Access (LIA), Act 207 of 1998 (1998), Latvijas Vestnesis No. 334/335 (1998), in FREDRIK ERICSSON, WORLD BANK, ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN
LATVA: PRACTICE, PROVISIONS AND PROPOSALS 11 (1999) (on file with authors).
41. The Law on State Statistics was passed on November 6, 1997, and amended January 28, 1999. See The Law on State Statistics of the Republic of Latvia (1997), at
http://www.csb.lv/Satr/alik.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
42. The Law On the Bank of Latvia was passed on May 19, 1992, and amended June
18, 1997, October 29, 1998, November 4, 1999, June 1, 2000, and October 25, 2001. See
Law "On the Bank of Latvia" (unofficial translation), at http://www.bank.lv/about
English/Likuns/likums.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
43. See THE CABINET MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, INSTRUCTION ON THE
PROCEDURE FOR PREPARATION OF ANNUAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS, INSTRUCTION No. 3 (Dec.
22, 1998) (on file with authors). This instruction was passed pursuant to Article 15.1 of the
Law on Organization of the Cabinet of Ministers.
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complishments. The quality of the reports vary widely, but they are eagerly read by many businesses and NGOs." While availability of hard
copies of these publications is a problem, many ministries are increasingly
putting their entire reports, or excerpts thereof, on Web sites.45 Other types
of information disclosure, meanwhile, may occur through the initiative of
individual agencies. For example, the State Enterprise Registry, which has
published many brochures about its work, maintains a listserv by which it
* 46
can disseminate commercial law information.
As the phenomenon of voluntary information disclosure grows, the Latvian government should consider adoption of more expansive and uniform
principles for affirmative information provisions, including a more encompassing list of the types of documents that must be provided in hard copy
and electronically, minimum requirements for agency Web sites, and general policies on the commercial re-use of public sector data.
In general, these recommendations are consistent with those that could
be made for most transition countries, and are a useful foundation for more
extensive anti-corruption efforts. There is no significant impediment to requiring government ministries to make available to the public at least some
minimum quantity of basic information about executive branch agencies.
As availability requirements are becoming increasingly common in Western and East European legislation, useful models are available to transition
country drafters. Insofar as the primary means of information distribution
can be electronic via Web sites, the cost of providing information can be
kept relatively low. Secondary distribution in hard copy form to interested
members of the public can be carried out by various NGOs and business
associations as they see fit. Implementation of modest affirmative information provision norms can serve as a useful indication of a country's
commitment to government transparency. Those transition countries that
resist such legal innovations outright are likely to be resistant to a variety of
other reforms designed to promote genuine public participation and democratization.

44. Interview with Inese Voika, Executive Director, Deina (Mar. 19, 2001); Interview
with Normunds Belskis, Director of the Press and Public Relations Department, Ministry of
the Interior of Latvia (Mar. 16, 2001).
45. At the same time, the Soros Foundation has reportedly reached agreement with a
number of government ministries and other bodies to place a number of reports, studies, and
other documents on a special Web site in the interest of fostering greater public policy dialogue. Interview with Vita Terauda, Executive Director, Soros Foundation-Latvia (June 25,
2001).
46. Interview with Maija Celmina, Director of Public Affairs, State Enterprise Registry
(Mar. 16, 2001).
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C. Public Participationin Government Rulemaking and Law Drafting
In most countries around the world, the drafting of rules and legislation
represents a relatively closed affair, carried out by small working groups
composed of a few agency personnel and a very small number of outside
(usually academic) experts. In many cases, their work product may contain
impractical provisions, conflict with other normative acts, or fail to address
the actual needs of intended beneficiaries. The result are legal acts that fail
to be implemented as envisioned and that often require extensive revision
and attendant political embarrassment. To remedy these problems, some
countries have sought to open up their regulatory and legislative drafting
processes at the agency level by permitting or requiring some degree of
public comment. Among the transition countries, only Hungary has a
comprehensive law requiring such public input.47 Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, have informal arrangements for inviting
knowledgeable and interested NGOs to participate in consultations or provide comments on draft regulations and/or legislation.48 Even in Western
Europe, truly open procedures for regulatory drafting are quite rare; Norway, for example, is one of the few countries that requires ministers to send
all legislative and regulatory proposals out for public comment to all interested institutions and interest groups, which in turn have ninety days to
provide written opinions thereon. 49
Latvia has generally treated the issue of public participation in ministry
rulemaking and legislative drafting on an ad hoc, ministry-by-ministry basis. In the past year, however, the government has moved to adopt two related formal mechanisms that seek to elicit public comments on all regulations and legislation passing through the Cabinet of Ministers. One
requires ministries proposing new rules or legislation to document the extent to which they have consulted with NGOs or foreign experts on their
proposals (a so-called "annotation process").5 0 The other requires proposed
47.
48.

See GALLIGAN & SM[LOV, supra note 8, pt. 2.3 (discussing Act XI of 1987).
For example, governments in Albania, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and

Slovenia reportedly regularly invite NGOs to comment on draft legislation and participate in
drafting committees, although these practices are not formalized and the circle of NGOs invited often varies. See REG'L ENVTL. CTR., DooRs TO DEMOCRACY: CURRENT TRENDS AND
PRACTIcEs INPUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING IN CENTRAL AND

EASTERN EUROPE 40-41 (1998).
49.

See DooRs TO DEMOCRACY: WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 32, at 25. In the United

States, of course, the APA requires agencies publish in the FederalRegister a notice of proposed rulemaking stating: (1) the time, place, and nature of any public rulemaking proceedings; (2) the legal authority under which the agency proposes the rule; (3) the language of
the proposed rule or a summary thereof; and (4) an invitation to interested persons to submit
comments within a certain time frame. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
50. See Regulations on Internal Procedures and Activities of the Cabinet of Ministers,
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rules and legislation to be posted on the Cabinet of Ministers Web site for
comment shortly before the Cabinet takes action on them."'
Despite their potential to promote greater public participation in law
making and rulemaking, both of these mechanisms fall short of their
promise. The annotation process not only provides little guidance as to
how the consultations are to be conducted (posing the danger that the process will be treated as a mere formality), but also does not even by its terms
require that consultations be held (although they are obviously expected).
Further, the Web site posting requirement, though laudable, is hostage to
the country's low Internet connectivity and occurs at a relatively late stage
in the drafting process, when regulations are essentially ready for final
comment and approval by the Cabinet of Ministers.
In moving toward a more participatory drafting regime, the government
should consider reforms that would encourage or require ministries and
administrative bodies to devote substantial time to public consultation and
solicitation of comments closer to the beginning of the legislative or regulatory drafting process. This could involve more precise guidance as to the
time and manner by which consultations or public comments would be invited, and as to the use of diverse channels to disseminate such information
(e.g., Web site posting, e-mail or mail distribution to interested parties,
52
etc.).
Relatively few transition countries may be willing or prepared to entertain such requirements at this time. Without a recent history of contested
government or respectful state-civil society relations, it is difficult to
imagine certain transition regimes voluntarily inviting a range of outside
parties to participate in the regulatory drafting process. For most such regimes, such practices must emerge on an informal, agency-by-agency basis
as the government seeks outside sectoral expertise (and perhaps legitimacy)
as a matter of necessity on discrete subjects. Only as individual ministries
No. 160, art. III, 12-18 (1996) (on file with authors). Also included in the process is a
cost-benefit analysis of the new regulation conducted by the Ministry of Finance and an
analysis of an act's legal impact by the Ministry of Justice. These two critical items are reviewed in the Chancellery by the Legal Department and by the Policy Coordination Unit,

respectively.
51. See CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE REPuBuC OF LATVIA (providing general announcements of the Cabinet of Ministers), at http://www.mk.gov.iv (last visited Feb. 6,

2002).
52. The feasibility of such a process is demonstrated by the effectiveness of the manner
in which the country's new Commercial Code was drafted. In that case, the country's State
Enterprise Registry invited several waves of comments on various drafts of the law using a
listserv containing the names of over 1,500 interested parties. Reportedly, at least fifty to
sixty very high quality responses were received from interested parties and were given replies by the Registry. Interview with Maija Celmina, Director of Public Affairs, State Enterprise Registry (Mar. 16, 2001).
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and agencies develop a greater sense of security in opening up the drafting
process to trusted NGOs and the business community can more uniform,
formal solutions be considered.
Despite this expected caution or resistance on the part of many transition

country governments, reformers and donors should be aggressive in identifying and supporting appropriate opportunities for more open drafting pro-

cesses. Too often, these parties operate on the assumption that state-civil
society relations are insufficiently developed in many transition countries
to permit productive collaboration in the drafting of important regulations
cannot be held hostage to the delays or discord that might attend a more inclusive deliberative process. Instead, reformers and donors should look for

creative ways to bring state officials, NGOs, and business representatives
together (e.g., workshops and informal consultative meetings) to forge the

kinds of relationships and trust that will allow more sustained drafting experiments to be conducted3 and eventually, more systematically open drafting processes to emerge.5

D. Responsive Provisionof Government Information
Unlike laws solely providing for the affirmative provision of informa-

tion, in which the government actively makes available certain fundamental
information in circumscribed areas, freedom of information laws may additionally or alternatively provide for the provision of a wide variety of

other information upon demand by the citizenry. In recent years, a number
of transition countries have enacted access to information laws, including
Hungary,5 4 Lithuania," Slovakia,5 6 Bulgaria,17 and Georgia.58 Typically,

53. One well-documented effort of this kind is Bulgaria's effort to bring together key
representatives from the business community, government, and civil society together to develop new policies for small and medium enterprise (SME) development, including the
drafting of a new SME law. See DERICK BRrNKERHOFF ET AL., SME PoLucY REFORM IN
BULGARIA, CASE STUDY No. 7, USAID IMPLEMENTING POLIcY CHANGE PROJECT 7-8 (2000).
54. See Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the Publicity of Data
of Public Interest, ch. I § 1 (1992) (Hungary) (providing everyone may have access to data
of public interest), available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/countries/hungary/
hungaryprivacylawI 992.html.
55. See Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, ch. I § 1 (1996) (Lithuania)

(setting forth the procedure of obtaining, processing, and disseminating of public information), availableat http://www3.1rs.lt/plsinter/w3-eng-h.home.
56. See OPEN Soc'y FOUND. IN BRATISLAVA, ACT ON FREE ACCESS TO INFORMATION, A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK

FOR PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (2000) (discussing Act 211/2000

OFFICIALS AND

LOCAL

SELF-

on Free Access to Information),

availableat http://www.nobribes.org/rcSlovakia.htm.
57. See Access to Public Information Act, ch. I § 1 (2000) (Bulgaria) (noting adoption
on June 22, 2000, and publication in State Gazet on July 7, 2000), available at
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such legislation can or should contain a presumption of public access, with
only a few limited subject areas (e.g., state security, confidential commercial information) deemed subject to possible withholding, based on legislatively determined criteria and reflective of specific, identifiable harms. An
independent adjudicator should also exist to resolve disputes over access.
This could include an information commissioner or ombuds, as well as ultimate recourse to the courts.
Latvia's LIA became effective in 1999 after adoption the previous year.
However, it suffers from several textual and conceptual deficiencies, including these:
*

The law may not apply to all state administrative bodies;

"

Many definitions are unclear;

"

The law does not clearly take precedence over other laws concerning
the disposition of government information and its access by the
public;

•

There is no presumption of public access, qualified only by a limited
number of legislatively defined exemptions;

" There is no public interest or other balancing test governing disclosure of otherwise restricted information; and
•

The right to appeal a refusal of access to the courts may be artificially limited.

Many of these impediments have been documented in a study conducted
in 1999-2000 by Delna, a leading nongovernmental organization. The
Delna study depicted government officials as poorly informed about citizens' rights under the law and hostile to information requests.59
http://www.aip-bg.org/library/laws/apia.htn (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
58. See CENT. & E. EuR. L. INTIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS'N, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT LAW
OF GEORGIA ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/
ceeli/assessments/Countries/Georgia.html. Ultimately, the Georgian access to information
requirements were incorporated into that country's new administrative procedure law. See
The General Administrative Code of Georgia, No. 2352, ch. Il (1999) (providing "freedom

of information" effective January 1, 2000), available at http://www.lexinfosys.de/
lexinfosys/LexInfoSys/geo/12/genadmincode/genadmincode-eng.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2002).
59. The Delna study is described in that organization's Annual Report for 1999-2000.
See DELNA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21.
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The law's shortcomings on paper and in practice necessitate not only
amendments to the LIA, but the designation of a state organization to serve
as a central source of expertise and enforcement authority on the law.
Plans are now underway, it turns out, to grant such powers to the existing
State Data Protection Inspectorate within the Ministry of Justice, whose
mandate is to ensure the protection of confidential personal and business
information. Similar functions have been combined with data protection
responsibilities in the office of the Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. 60 The new Inspectorate
could have the following kinds of duties:
"

Commenting on draft legislation and regulations affecting access to
information across the government;

"

Serving as a source of expertise on interpretation and application of
the law through formal guidance to executive branch agencies and
provision of public information;

*

Investigating public complaints about information access; and

*

Serving as a first or second instance decision maker, able to issue
non-binding yet authoritative and appealable decisions on disputed
access matters.

It is not surprising that many other transition countries struggling with
democratic reforms would resist the adoption of legislation mandating a
system of responsive information provision.6 ' Fewer still would go so far
as to invest in the establishment of a central information access agency, as
Hungary and Latvia have done. Not only do such actions go wholly
against the grain of government secrecy that was the currency of communist regimes for decades (and that still characterizes many authoritarian or
quasi-authoritarian post-communist governments), but the costs of supporting a working freedom of information regime may be substantial. 62
60. The tasks and functions of this office are extensively described at the Commissioner's Web site. See PARLiAmENTARY COMM'RS OFFICE OF HUNGARY, at http://
www.obh.hu (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
61. One exception is the Republic of Georgia, which became the most recent transition
country to pass a freedom of information law, despite its sometimes shaky hold on democracy. See generallyDELNA ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 21.
62. For example, in 1966 the annual costs of administering FOIA requests in the
United States were projected at $50,000 a year; by 1981, the Office of Management and
Budget estimated the government's costs at $250 million. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating
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Regulations governing access procedures must be drafted, civil servants
must be trained in the nuances of the responsive information provision statute, and physical and electronic records must be carefully organized and
catalogued. Faced with these significant challenges, some countries
adopting such access regimes have contemplated a phased implementation
approach.63 Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that in the short
term, most reformers view the affirmative provision of key government information as by far the more fundamental and cost-effective investment in
government transparency.
E. Administrative Procedureand JudicialReview ofAgency Decisions
All non-totalitarian societies need a mechanism to resolve disputes that
arise between the government and its citizens. In theory, there are multiple
ways to address the claims of persons who claim to have been adversely
affected by erroneous, abusive, or illegal government action. One option is
to allow the chief executive's administration to handle such claims. However, limited staff and the dislike of becoming embroiled in potentially
controversial matters usually leads such offices to maintain an arm's length
approach toward such disputes. While the legislature is often more willing
to listen to citizens' complaints as a matter of constituent representation, it
too has a limited interest in handling a large volume of such claims. Ultimately, resource constraints, the need for decentralized expertise, and political calculations make such options problematic.
These shortcomings lead to two common sense alternatives to direct involvement by elected officials: (1) an ombuds system, and/or (2) an adDemocratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 660 n.3 (1984). This led Justice Antonin Scalia to
call FOIA "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine
Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored." Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act
HasNo Clothes, REG. Mar./Apr. 15 (1982).
63. The contrast between implementation of Freedom of Information laws in Hungary
and Bulgaria is instructive. In Hungary, the Parliament created a Commissioner for Data
Protection and Freedom of Information in 1995 as an overall education, monitoring, investigative, and limited enforcement body with a significant budget and staff (now totaling
twenty full-time employees). The Commissioner's office has undertaken a significant public education effort while simultaneously creating a wide range of regulatory precedent
through its case investigations. See generally PARLIAMENTARY COMM'R FOR DATA PROT. &
FREEDOM OF INFO., PARLIAMENTARY COMM'RS OFFICE OF HUNGARY, THE FIRST THREE
YEARS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION, at http://www.obh.hu/adatved/indexekfbeszindex.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2002). Bulgaria, by contrast, which passed its Access to Information Act in 2000, has yet to
contemplate the creation of a similar body or to issue any implementing guidance on the
law. It has been left up to an NGO, the Access to Information Programme, to furnish infornation and guidance to the public on ways to use the new legislation. See ACCESS TO INFO.
PROGRAMME FOUND., at http://www.aip-bg.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
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ministrative appeals system backed up by recourse to the courts. National
and programmatic ombudsmen flourish in many countries as a means of
obtaining independent and impartial review of citizen complaints and resolving many of them with simple intercession or clarification. Yet many
issues are either too technically complex or intractable to turn over to ombudsmen exclusively.
Courts offer another independent and impartial decision maker. Yet
courts are not necessarily the best forums in which to address disputes over
the administration of highly specialized government programs. Even when
permitted to review the substantive, as opposed to procedural, basis for an
agency decision, courts have limited time, resources, and expertise. Large
numbers of cases must also be winnowed before they reach the courts.
As a result, there is no practical escape from first-instance reliance on
administrative review within the bureaucracy, supplemented by judicial review, and possibly ombuds review, in particular kinds of cases where requested. Additional modifications of a system of administrative review
may include requirements for multiple levels of administrative appeal, exhaustion of administrative remedies before appealing to the courts and/or
ombudsmen, and multiple levels of judicial review. Other important considerations may concern what kind of "hearing," if any, is to be offered to
an appellant at the administrative level, what kinds of elements an administrative decision should include, who may bring appeals and/or intervene
as third parties in administrative or judicial appeals, and what kinds of relief may be provided to prevailing parties in court.
These basic characteristics of administrative review may assume significantly different forms and levels of complexity in various countries, depending on their history, legal culture, political system, depth of democratization, openness, and the level of public participation. Common law
countries, with less faith in bureaucrats' technocratic expertise and capacity
for fairness, have tended to ensure that appeals of agency decisions within
the bureaucracy are bolstered by formal adjudicative procedures and presided over by independent, often quasi-judicial, hearing officers. Civil law
systems, less steeped in adversarial procedure and more deferential to administrative authority, have neither the legal tradition nor the political inclination to judicialize agency appeals procedures. Moreover, most civil
law systems (with key exceptions like Germany and Austria) feature appeals processes that may vary widely from agency to agency.
Latvia's draft Administrative Procedure Law (APL), recently adopted on
October 25, 2001, is patterned on a relatively unified German model. Like
the Verwaltungsverfarhengesetz,the German Administrative Procedure Act
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of 1976,6 the Latvian law is designed to provide a uniform framework of
general principles and guidelines by which agency decision making must
be conducted. It does not, however, prescribe an actual uniform procedure,
since each agency is free to adopt specific procedures consistent with the
main law. Under this German approach, judicial review tends to focus less
on whether the correct procedures were followed, and more on the appropriateness of substantive outcomes.
Significantly, the new Latvian APL effects a number of changes over
current practice, many of which are emblematic of the kind of reforms that
are required in transition countries (whether or not such countries have earlier embarked on any administrative procedural reforms). 65 These include
the following:
"

The specific, democratic principles of law to be applied by administrative bodies and the courts are enumerated (e.g., new concepts
such as equality, proportionality, legality, etc.). Most transition
countries do not have any overarching democratic, Rule of Law
principles with which to guide bureaucratic decision making;

*

There is an explicit requirement that the petitioner have an opportunity to be heard at the agency level. In many cases, existing legislation acknowledges such an opportunity, but there is no uniform requirement that it be available as a civil right in any administrative
proceeding;

" The form and elements of an administrative decision are explained
in detail, along with the right to demand a decision according to
these requirements. The hodgepodge of existing legislation governing administrative procedure in most transition countries does not
provide uniform, explicit guidance about how administrative acts
should be presented, making it more difficult for citizens to invoke
64. See Edward J. Eberle, The West German Administrative ProcedureAct: A Study in
Administrative Decision Making, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 67, 67 n. I (1984); see also Peter L.

Lindseth, ComparingAdministrative States: Susan Rose-Ackerman and the Limits ofPublic
Law in Germany and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 589, 589 n.3 (1996) (article
review) (discussing generally administrative procedures in Germany); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 30, at 1279 n.6.
65. Some countries, like Latvia, may have earlier adopted partial solutions, such as a

Cabinet-level regulation prescribing certain procedural requirements. See The Cabinet
Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 154 (1995) (on file
with authors). But, this regulation fails to address issues of judicial review and does not incorporate the key principles of administrative procedure necessary to meet some require-

ments for accession to the E.U.
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their rights and press them on appeal;
*

The principle of allowing damages for harms suffered as a result of
an administrative act, omission, or decision, is clarified. In most
transition countries, errors or wrongdoing by the government at most
results in efforts to undo the mistake or wrong; rarely are monetary
damages permitted that usually have a more noticeable impact on
curbing systemic bureaucratic injustice; and

" The state's burden of proof under judicial review is made explicit.
Many transition countries that permit judicial review of administrative decisions utilize a regular civil procedure or similar variant to
guide court process, failing to place the evidentiary burden on the
state as a matter of principle, consistent with the state's greater information and litigation advantages.
Even when solid achievements, like the Latvian APL, are acknowledged,
significant legal shortcomings may persist. For example, the Latvian APL
is still ambiguous about whether and when an oral "hearing" may be obtained in administrative agencies. The law also may end up overburdening
the courts by failing to insist that citizens exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing judicial appeals-a tempting option based on the lack of
confidence in the bureaucracy, but one that may arouse similar disillusionment in the judicial system if courts are unable to meet the public's demand
for justice.
Because it involves significant institutional change within both the bureaucracy and the courts, it is understandable that creating or reconstructing
a system of administrative procedure review is often viewed as among the
most ambitious kinds of administrative law reform, appropriate only for
some of the most progressive transition countries. For political parties to
be sufficiently concerned about restraining bureaucratic discretion across
multiple ministries and agencies, it is likely that some tradition of contested
government needs to exist as an incentive for serious administrative procedure reform. On the other hand, even if such contested government is just
taking shape, it may be possible to introduce a revamped system of administrative procedure on a phased or pilot basis, starting with a small number
of agencies that have progressive leadership and that have several constituencies interested in reform (e.g., new business entrants and consumers in
certain sectors). Meanwhile, even if a country's judiciary is otherwise
weak or lacks technical expertise, special administrative tribunals or chambers within the existing court system can be established to handle new administrative appeals from the pilot agencies on a transitional basis. In this
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way, initial efforts at administrative procedure reform may be feasible even
in countries whose political economies and/or institutional endowments
might otherwise deter such initiatives.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORMS

As has been noted repeatedly over the past decade, even the best designed law reform effort, built around the most sensible, easy-to-administer
legislation, will founder if plans for implementation are not well thought
out and executed.66 Of course, the first important consideration may be
whether to table certain reforms unless particular background conditions
are met. However, even if administrative law reforms are undertaken in
generally congenial environments with respectable institutional endowments and an adequate resource base, reformers still need to map out detailed and thoughtful implementation plans. Among other things, these
plans must acknowledge the multidimensionality of the reform process and
the importance of cultivating a wide range of constituencies for reform.
As the USAID-sponsored Implementing Policy Change (IPC) project
has shown,67 successful policy reform demands that reformers play close
attention-in advance-to each of the elements of the policy cycle, which
encompasses the following:
"

Policy Legitimization (identifying who can champion reform, what
the level of support is, and whether a task force or advisory group is
necessary to broaden the reform leadership);

"

Constituency-Building (employing appropriate coordination mechanisms, workshops, and public education);

"

Resource Accumulation (including taking advantage of civil society
partnerships);

66. See, e.g., JuLio FAUNDEz, L., JUST. & GLOBAL DEV., LEGAL REFORM IN
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES--MAKING HASTE SLOWLY (Jan. 8, 2001), available at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2000-1/faundez.html. See also Wade Channell,
Presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Nov. 16, 2001) (providing
an overview of the presentation "Making Law Reform Work"), at http://www.ceip.org/
files/events/events.aspEventlD=429.
67. For a good introduction to the topic of strategic management of the policy implementation process, see generally DERICK W. BRINKERHOFF, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv.,
IPC MONOGRAPH No. 1, ENHANCING CAPACITY FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1996) (discussing the Implementing Policy
Change Project).
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OrganizationalDesign (matching the organizational structure of reforms to environmental needs, e.g., establishment of a special implementation unit in certain institutions);

" Resource Mobilization (developing special incentives and training
programs for targeted personnel, as well as inter-agency coordination mechanisms); and
*

Impact Monitoring (developing empirical bases for measuring reform progress, often through cooperation with civil society groups).

A well-conceived implementation plan focused on sustainable institutional reform takes special note not only of key supply-side tasks, such as
the creation of practical regulations and internal procedures memorialized
in written guidelines and manuals, but also of the importance of testing and
improving such procedures through demand-side support for the users of
such systems. The plan should thus employ different kinds of workshops,
training programs, and public education initiatives to help with information
dissemination, explore the parameters of possible partnerships, test the
strength of particular constituencies, and promote practical problemsolving.
At the request of the Latvian Ministry of Justice, the authors applied
these principles in drafting an implementation plan for two of the five administrative law mechanisms discussed in this Article: the new APL; and
the existing, but underutilized Law on Information Access. Due to relatively low public and government consciousness about the two laws, the
team believed a special government-wide championing of implementation
was required-mandated by the Cabinet of Ministers, and with overall program coordination carried out by the Ministry of Justice. Reflecting the
breadth and multidimensionality of the reforms, other significant responsibilities were to be carried out by the Secretariat of the Special Ministry for
Public Sector Reforms (guidance and training for civil servants by the Secretariat, the State Civil Service Administration, and the School of Public
Administration), the Special Ministry for Local Government Affairs and
the Union of Municipalities (guidance and training for local government
officials), the Legal Department of the State Chancellery (oversight over
harmonization of other relevant laws, regulations, and other normative acts
with the APL and LIA), the Ministry of Finance (creation of a feasible
compensation scheme), and the Supreme Court and Latvian Judicial
Training Center (guidance and training for judges). Representatives of
these institutions should sit on a program-wide central task force structure
(or "steering committee") to be created at the outset of the initiative to
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function as a kind of board of directors of the program, providing highlevel guidance to the Ministry of Justice.
Although the details of this proposed implementation plan are beyond
the scope of this Article, several key elements are worth mentioning in
connection with the two laws:
"

Creationand/or harmonization of legalframeworks. All legislation
intersecting with the APL and LIA (e.g., in the case of the LIA, laws
on secrecy and on privacy protection), and the patchwork of Soviet
era and post-Soviet agency norms potentially affected by the APL
and LIA, should be inventoried and then harmonized to conform to
the new law's procedural requirements;

" Implementation of new/modified administrative appeals and LIA
procedures. Through problem-solving workshops, internal instructions, and special manuals, the plan ensures that agencies will oversee and report back to the Cabinet of Ministers on implementation of
new and modified procedures consistent with the APL and LIA;
" A particularizedapproachto trainingactivities. The basic approach
to training relies on a core group of experienced trainers steeped in
the nuances of the APL and/or LIA, who can help develop a broader
cadre of instructors through a training-of-trainers mechanism. However, the proposed implementation program also features separate
training and education modules aimed at agency lawyers and managers, municipal officials, judges, practicing lawyers, law students,
procurators, businesses, the media, and NGOs. In the case of procurators, who have significant influence over how older generations
view the bureaucracy and their own civil rights, there should be special training in how to provide citizens with proper guidance or referrals to other organizations when consulted about administrative
appeals or the need to access government information;
"

Treatment of municipalities under the program. Because municipalities are among the agencies least attuned to procedural regularity
in their decision making, they are targeted for special attention from
the program on a geographically dispersed pilot or demonstration
basis;

*

Development of a compensation mechanism. The Ministries of Justice and Finance should develop a workable compensation mechanism to fund appropriate monetary awards under the APL. Because
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this is a particularly ambitious and costly endeavor for a transition
country to undertake-even one with a reasonably strong economy
and state sector, such as Latvia-the authors strongly recommended
that a system of monetary awards be phased in over time;
"

Public education. Public education (of individual citizens and busi-

nesses) should occur through a combination of targeted press coverage, public education campaigns (with leaflets and brochures), special research and polling, test litigation, and government publication
of official brochures and wall posters that will be placed in government offices according to official instructions. NGOs and businesses should be specifically enlisted to help monitor and test the
quality of the government's implementation effort;
" Research on compliance and development of legal reform proposals.
The Ministry of Justice should commission and/or encourage research on APL and LIA compliance as a basis for developing reform
proposals to eliminate ambiguities and loopholes in the two laws as
well as to locate implementation obstacles.
CONCLUSION

Few kinds of legislation and regulations are so modest in their apparent
import, yet have the potential to play such an important role in the lives of
ordinary citizens and in the development of a favorable business environment, as those forming a nation's administrative law framework. The significance of this framework looms even larger in transition countries with a
tradition of totally unaccountable bureaucracies. Administrative law reform offers a number of unique opportunities for economic growth and
democracy and governance reform strategies to be united at several key
interfaces between governments and civil society, and to promote the kind
of reciprocal trust-building relationships that are so lacking in most transitional societies.
While it may be that key administrative law-type mechanisms have little
chance of being taken seriously in other than democratic regimes with a
reasonably well-established pattern of contested government, even in
countries that possess these attributes, there have been relatively few reformers or donor agencies willing to make the adoption of such mechanisms a priority. This unwillingness may stem from true ignorance of such
mechanisms, or a preoccupation with existing categories of reform that do
not easily embrace such cross-cutting procedural subjects. Or, it may reflect thoughtful skepticism about whether societies where ruling elites and
a tradition of patronage dominate can yield genuine opportunities for cer-
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tain kinds of new entrants (e.g., small businesses and various NGOs and
grassroots organizations) to engage in genuine consultative dialogue with
government officials. Certainly the Latvian experience with strengthening
public participation and transparency in government decision making thus
far-and it is still in its early stages-demonstrates how much work is to be
done, even in a relatively advanced and favorably situated transition country. Only time will tell whether the country can marshal the necessary political will, public administration ingenuity, and resources necessary to begin to operationalize successfully its various administrative law
mechanisms. But Latvia offers a potentially useful conceptual and legal
framework for how transition countries that are serious about such reform
efforts can approach such an undertaking.
Even in somewhat less favorable national environments, adoption of
such administrative law-type mechanisms and their implementation on a
sectoral or agency basis has the potential to generate "islands of reform"
based on an alignment of particular reform constituencies (and the popularity of many kinds of regulatory reforms) with procedural mechanisms
giving voice to these interests. Infrastructure and utilities reform efforts
over the past decade or so provide some illustration of this phenomenon,
while local government reform initiatives (especially revolving around
budgetary processes) generally offer another window on the extent to
which such mechanisms can take hold in particular political and institutional environments. 68 For these reasons, administrative law reform merits
much more scholarly and empirical research, and a significantly more
prominent place in contemporary discussions about the promotion of democratization and efforts to establish the Rule of Law in transitional societies.

68. See, e.g., NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Assoc., GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY
REGIMES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT (Asian Dev. Bank, Final

Rep., 1998) (focusing on various governance criteria that enhance procedural protections for
private investors, including accountability, transparency, predictability, autonomy, participation, and clarity of roles and objectives between ministers and regulators); JANELLE
PLUMMER, MUNICIPALITIES AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: A SOURCEBOOK FOR CAPACITY

BUILDNG (2000) (surveying a wide range of vehicles for public participation in local government policy making and decision making).

